The calm and cool Sunday afternoon breeze was slapping travellers on
this quiet country road down south. Traffic was light thus driving on a two
lane smooth road deeper into a sprawling sub division was like high ways to
heaven. The clear blue sky was strikingly colorful and immaculate. You could
feel heaven hugging the earth this mid cold falls Sunday. At the median of the
road were trees blooming with kaleidoscope of colours. Soon, the colourful
leaves would turn brown and the leaves would begin to fall from the trees. Old
farmlands littered with antic farm equipment dotting the roadsides, inside
beautifully landscaped gardens and acres of land. Behold the sights of corner
stores along this road, set in between the pleasant valley mountains and the
blue ridge mountains of North Carolina. Even the benighted wandering birds flew
helplessly with the freedom of their souls seeking pleasure and peace along
this clean and manicured country road.
I pulled into this upscale sprawling subdivision and found him, Lt. SOS
Echendu
This is where he calls home now, along with his beautiful wife and
family. He is no longer a Nigerian soldier, but an investor and a nuclear
medicine scientist living in the United States, 24 years after he masterminded
the siege on Dodan Barracks, the seat of the Federal Military Government of
Nigeria, in Nigeria’s last coup of April 22, 1990 that attempted to topple then
President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida.
For many years, Lt. Echendu, described by one of his colleagues, Capt.
Tolofori as “a very brilliant and courageous officer,” was on the run due
partly to the failure of the coup and a heavy bounty on his head by the then
military ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida.
“Jebose, I wasted seven years of my life on the run. Hence, I married
late. It’s a huge sacrifice worthy for my country. No regrets.”
April 22, 1990, a group of army Majors and Lieutenants attempted an
uprising against the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida.
These young officers were led by late Major Gideon Okar. Lt. Echendu was one of
the major key players of that coup. His mission was to implode Dodan Barracks
and as an armoured vehicles officer expert, dislocate all armoured vehicles,
secure the Dodan Barracks perimeters in order to allow the infantry entrance,
execute and or capture the president. He was given this assignment because he
lived inside Dodan Barracks and tactically knew the logistics and operations of
the environment.
In this first time conversation since his escape, Lt. Echendu walks on
JEBOSE BOULEVARD, opens up on his involvement in the coup and why he did not
kill IBB when he had him in sight. His narratives:
“I got involved with the coup thus: The country was being administered
the wrong way. There were sufferings and Nigerians were being abused and
marginalised by Babangida’s administration. Nigerians were being dehumanised
economically and socially. My unit had sent me on a course to Bauchi. Actually,
I was not supposed to be in that course. Lt. Pat Obasi was supposed to attend
but when due to other exigencies he was not able to attend, Brigadier General
M.Y Ibrahim, current acting General Officer Commanding (GOC) of one of
Nigeria’s military divisions was sent from my unit. Both Obasi and MY Ibrahim
belonged to the 33rd Regular Combatant Course of the Nigerian Defence Academy.
I was a member of the 35th Course. After MY Ibrahim had spent roughly three
weeks at the Nigerian Army Armour School, Bauchi, an opening for a foreign
course became available, MY Ibrahim was drafted for the course. He was
therefore withdrawn from the platoon commander’s course in Bauchi. My unit then
was required to fill its allotted spot. An officer needed to be drafted, that
was how I was drafted to represent my unit. Officers of the 34th course in my
unit, who were my seniors, were by-passed because my unit needed to field an
officer who would excel. I got to Bauchi on a Sunday, the following day,
Monday, was the final examination day for “Communications” – the first of four
phases of the entire course. Expectedly, I didn’t do well on the communications
phase. I was, I think, 23 out of 28 officers and I didn’t like that. But at the
end of the entire course, I was third overall Then Lt. Col. Umar Abubakar was
the Commandant of the Armoured School. I went to him to bitterly complain about
the injustice of withdrawing an officer from a local course for a foreign
course. In my mind, irrespective of ethnicity, every officer was supposed to be
treated equally. But in this case, equality was thrown to the winds.
“While I was attending this course, I got a call from my friend who
passed a coded message to me. After I decoded the message, I knew what he
meant. This was early 1990; I was attending the Platoon Commanders course. I
quickly signed onto the plan. I didn’t think about it because I knew it was the
right thing to do.
“As a young man fresh from secondary school, I desired to be in the
service and serve my country. I wanted to be a soldier. I visited the Nigerian
Defence Academy to enlist. A former Commander of the Signal Corps gave me the
forms that I used to apply to NDA. I took the NDA admission entrance
examination and succeeded. I was invited to Kaduna for interview. Then the late
Sanni Abacha who was a Brigadier, was the Board Selection interview chairman.
He conducted the selection process with other officers. One unique thing he did
was to announce the results at the Nigerian Defence Academy. This approach of
his prevented the removal and replacement of successful candidates with the
names of sons of well-connected Nigerians. I was enlisted as a member of the
35th Regular Combatant Course and three years later, I graduated. After
graduation, I was posted to the 201 Corps Headquarters Company of the Nigerian
Army Armoured Corps, the admin unit of the entire Armoured Corps. We provided
security to Babangida who was also an armoured officer. I knew about the
strategies, logistics and workings of Dodan Barracks, including the
electronics, communication and security operations. I lived intermittently
inside Dodan Baracks between 1986 until the coup.
“Three Igbo officers took part in the revolution. We got involved for
the love of our country and fellow citizens. We were attempting to change the
sad direction the country was heading with the Babangida’s military
administration. Meself, late Lt. C Y Ozoalor and Lt. P C Obasi were the only
Igbo military officers involved.
“Jebose, injustice should not be tribalised and sectionalised. What was
going on, then, in our beloved nation state wasn’t good. It was atrocious in
the Nigerian army where certain ethnic groups were being marginalised by the
elite ruling class. For instance, to become an adjutant or admin officer in a
unit, you had to be related to a Northerner or somehow be connected to the
oligarchy. It wasn’t nationalistic. So what we did, in a way, was to try to
correct some of the unpatriotic things that were going on, including but not
limited to, god-fatherism culture in the Army. To advance in the army, you had
to be connected, know a retired or senior serving army officer, a chief, Alhaji
or a businessman who had money… that wasn’t bringing out the best in our army
officers and Nigerians. We knew something was wrong. And we knew something had
to be done; but then, did we the people, have the courage to deal with it? That
was our problem. I was glad that within the army, I was connected to officers
who had the courage to pay the ultimate price in making sure we got it right.
“We were completely and highly prepared to die for our country. I joined
the revolutionaries because I wanted to bring about the best possible change
for Nigeria. I live in the US now and have been working here for a long time.
If the founders did not pay the ultimate price and made the costliest
sacrifice, may be America would not be as great as it is today. Sometimes in
the life of a great nation, few people would have to pay the ultimate price for
the benefit of future generations. That was what my colleagues and I did. We
sacrificed for a better future for our children, a better Nigeria: Most of the
officers were single, but we wanted to make eternal sacrifices, and we did.
“The coup may seem sectional in outlook. In any organisation, when a
decision is made and if you are a team player, you either opt out; betray the
cause or you go with the decision. I did not see or read late Major Orka’s
speech that was broadcast to the nation on that day…. But since my group had
been credited with that speech, I stand 100 per cent behind it. However, If I
were the one who wrote the speech, would I carve out some states in the speech?
You bet I wouldn’t. Were things going wrong? Yes. Things were really, really
bad, but then, if I had to write that speech, to carve out any portion out of
the core nation of Nigeria, the answer would be NO. We were in it to save
Nigeria and our people from the corrupt, reckless and indiscipline direction of
General Babangida’s administration. But do I stand behind the speech?
Absolutely yes. Remember General Collin Powell did not believe late Iraqi
President, Sadam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, but he had to go to
the United Nations to defend that position. A good soldier doesn’t have to
believe in everything, but you have to be able to be a team player. I never had
doubts about our mission. If I were writing the speech, I would have worded it
differently but I don’t regret our actions. I don’t regret the speech as
broadcast that day by Major Orka. Absolutely, no regrets.
“Did the coup really fail? I remind you that I was in control of Dodan
Barracks. You can’t be everywhere at the same time. If you think the coup
failed, well, we did not take over the government, but did it really fail?
Jebose, that’s debatable… The coup did not fail. Though we did not take over
the government , however, some corrective measures we enumerated that we didn’t
have the opportunity to institutionalise were embraced in spirit both by Gen.
Babangida and subsequent administrations. Some people benefitted and are still
benefitting from the actions of the coup. General Babangida, my fellow armoured
corps officer was not stripped of his presidential powers as a result of our
actions. Ask Gen. Babangida if he was ready to leave Lagos when he did. His
answer would be no. Did he go to Abuja as a result of what we did? He would say
yes, because he was no longer safe in Lagos. He arrested the family of Prof.
(Maj.)Mukoro and when they were rescued, IBB, our General, ran from Lagos to
Abuja because he knew he was no longer safe. We castrated IBB. We made him
impotent. We stripped him of the aura that surrounded him. He was no longer
that invincible man, the untouchable oracle. We made him human and the Nigerian
people saw that. He abandoned Dodan Barracks to me. I was in control of
Nigeria’s seat of government. I was in charge of Dodan Barracks for that brief
period. He ran away. Go ask him where he was. As of the time I was in control
of Dodan Barracks, he was not there. For that brief period, you could
technically say, there was a presidential power vacuum.
“Part of my responsibilities that day was to secure Dodan Barracks for
the infantry to hold the ground. I disabled it, but did you visit Dodan
Barracks the next day, after the coup when President Babangida did a media tour
of the place?
“Jebose, If we had succeeded, Nigeria wouldn’t be as decayed today as
citizens feel. For the sake of decency, it’s not up to me to say what I did but
history would vindicate the just. I am alive today because my time hadn’t come
in 1990.
“Gen. IBB was an armoured officer just like me. But I was more current
and he was far removed from the dynamics of the latest technologies of armoured
vehicles and weaponry then. Late UK Bello, my former colleague, had also been
removed from the dynamics of armoured vehicles operations. I delivered seminars
on armoured vehicle weaponry. If late Major Omar, a good man, had been the one
commanding 201 Corps Company then, it would have been more difficult for me to
take part. He was a detribalised Nigerian, he believed in your abilities and
not tribes. We had Shaibu too… so if Omar was the Commanding Officer, in April
1990, it would have been very difficult for me. The way you command your unit
as a military leader, sometimes would be a testament of good leadership or an
indictment of your leadership. Jebose, you are asking how I was able to
dislodge a military president, viewed as invincible and untouchable, the
almighty and powerful? Well, my friend, to God be the glory!”
“Why I didn’t kill General Ibrahim Babangida during the coup attempt,
especially when I had him within the perimeters of the environment at Dodan
Barrackss? First, this raised another question within the rank and file of the
military community. There has been this innuendo that I killed Babangida’s Aid
De Camp, U.K Bello. I did not kill Lt. Col. UK Bello. And General Babangida
knows that I did not kill him. But for propaganda purposes, a few misguided and
stupid folks have been insinuating that I killed Bello. No. I did not kill UK
Bello. The security agencies know that.
“I have a lot of respect for General Ibrahim Badamosi Babngida. It’s not
easy for you to rise to the peak and pinnacle of your career. Don’t forget he
was the Chief of the Army Staff, the Commander of the Armoured Corps. He is an
accomplished human being. We disagreed on how he managed the country. We looked
at the direction of the country and that was when we decided to make changes.
In that circumstance, a military person administering the country in the wrong
direction could only be changed through a coup de tat, by poison or any other
means beside the electoral process. You do not go to the ballot booths. It’s by
bullets. We didn’t have the option of ballots but bullets. We couldn’t vote him
out, so we decided to use the only available option to us.
But then, did I want
to kill him? No. Did I have the option to kill him?. Yes. Jebose, did I have
the bullets to kill him? Yes. Did I have the armoured rounds to shoot him? Did
I come in direct contact with him? Yes. Did I see him escape in the 504 Peugeot
vehicle? Yes. Was I in a position to blow up the vehicle as he escaped? Yes.
But did I want to kill him? No. Jebose, why did I not kill him? I was in my
20s, I was intellectually advanced. I wanted him captured alive and tried. I
wanted the nation to see him and read his crimes during his trial so that our
citizens would see where we were coming from. I wanted to set a different
standard from what used to obtain. Kill him and the case would be closed, but
capture him and set him on trial, then the Nigerian people would be able to
hear his crimes. Trying him and allowing him to defend himself would allow the
public to understand why he did the things he did and why we decided to do the
things we did. I had the opportunity to kill him. I knew how he escaped from
Dodan Barracks. I saw him escape in a Peugeot 504 but didn’t want to blow up
the vehicle. I could have killed him. I don’t regret letting him escape. It
wasn’t in my operational area to arrest him. We didn’t have infantry men. We
were armoured men; I had my crew, but I didn’t have the luxury of infantry to
hold the ground. There were lots of operational failures. I didn’t have any
communication because of security concerns. We didn’t want to compromise our
intelligence by using unsecured walkie-talkies to communicate… I was
incommunicado with the hope of other battalions realising the sensitivity of
where I was. “There was no way to call then… No cell phones then… I did not
have walkie- talkies because we didn’t want our communications intercepted. IBB
had the Mossad security team working for him even though we did not have diplomatic
relations with Israel. I was very young then and was able to do what I did,
despite all the security elements within Dodan Barracks. If you asked Gen
Babangida, he would still be wondering how the coup happened. From my angle, I
was good to my soldiers. One of my regrets is seeing some of the innocent
soldiers executed or sent to prison for a long time. They knew what was going
to happen but opted out early. They suffered injustice. The Nigerian system has
always been unjust. I escaped rather than being subjected to the injustice they
were subjected to. Our cause was just and we had good reasons to change the
direction of the country. I do not think any of my soldiers would say it would
be good for me to be executed and my remains poured acid in a mass grave.
Maj. Orkar refused to leave. He had opportunity to leave. The 42
soldiers that were executed were inhumanly buried. They poured acid on their
bodies and buried all of them in a mass grave. Orkar was not dismissed. Ozalor
and other colleagues of ours were not dismissed. They were tried, found guilty
and executed. Their families and children are entitled to their benefits. These
are some of the unresolved issues and I would hope President Goodluck Jonathan
would consider a reasonable resolution to this. You cannot deny the children of
slain military officers’ benefits. They were actively engaged in the military
when they were executed. Conviction of treason does not mean benefits should
stop. The earlier we start resolving these, the better. Those of us who
volunteered without coercion, fought for fairness and served our country,
deserve to be given the same treatment(s) as any other military officer with
similar circumstance(s). That principle of fairness is not being respected. You
cannot pardon a few and deny others their pardon as well. The benefits of Gen.
Diya, Brig, Gen. Gwadabe, Col. Bello Fadile have been restored. Their offences
were similar to those of the 1990 officers. The standards must be the same
across the board for all.
“I am disappointed at every military change of government in general
because you are supposed to be working with a colleague, but it is agonising to
take up arms against your colleagues. I am disappointed because we aimed at
reaching the top of our careers in the military. But I have no regrets
whatsoever. The Nigerian government under IBB declared me wanted. When you are
declared wanted without opportunity for a fair trial, it’s unfair for any brave
minded human being to say you went AWOL. There is a difference between a court
appointed legal system trial and a military tribunal trial that was monitored
and controlled by the man you attempted to remove from power. Those who were
not supposed to be executed were executed without fair trial and legal
representations. We knew if we failed, we would pay the ultimate price. And I
was prepared for that. I was willing to serve up my time. I was also clamouring
for the country to take a different direction. I was willing to die for
Nigeria. A coup is a coup. Nigerian civil war started because of a counter
coup. If you are giving those coup plotters benefit of doubt through pardon,
same should be extended to everyone. There shouldn’t be a discriminatory
pardon. I have been pardoned but my pardon has not been gazetted. My pardon has
not been gazetted while that of Lt. Col. Inyiam has been gazetted. My question
to the service chiefs, my former colleagues, the NSA, all our legislators,
ministers and all rational Nigerians is; how fair is it that my colleague Lt.
Col. Nyiam’s pardon has been gazetted, but I, Maj. Obahor, Lt. Obasi, Lt.
Okekumatalor, Lt. Okhiafoh, Maj. Edoja, Capt. Tolofari, Maj. Saliba Mukoro and
Lt. Henry Ogboru’s names have not been gazetted? Would it not be dragging
Nigeria’s name to the mud should we collectively take the Nigerian government
to World Court seeking clarification? Should we be allowed to do this when this
can be easily settled and resolved by the present administration?